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Comments

Criminalizing Consensual Transmission of HIV
Amanda Weisst

INTRODUCTION

In February of 2003, a shocking and controversial article
appeared in Rolling Stone Magazine. The author, Gregory A.
Freeman, identified a troubling practice among a minority of gay
men: "bug-chasing."1 Freeman's "bug-chasers" are HIV-negative
gay men who actively seek out infection, arranging to have unprotected sexual intercourse with infected partners. 2 This subculture is fueled by the internet, with "bug-chasers" and "giftgivers" (HIV-positive men willing to infect HIV-negative men)
posting messages on specialized gay websites. The article quotes
an authority attributing 25 percent of new infections among gay
men to "bug-chasing."4 While that authority has since claimed
that Freeman fabricated his quotes 5 and others have questioned
Freeman's statistics,6 there is a general consensus that the phe-

t B.A. 1997, Amherst College; M.A. 1998, Fordham University; J.D. Candidate 2007,
University of Chicago.
1 Gregory A. Freeman, In Search of Death, Rolling Stone 45 (Feb 6, 2003).
2 Id.

3 Id.
4 Id ("With about 40,000 new infections in the United States per year, according to
government reports, that would mean around 10,000 each year are attributable to that
more liberal definition of "bug-chasing".").
5 Dan Savage, Savage Love: Are Gay Men Intentionaly ContractingHIV, The
Village Voice (Jan 29-Feb 4, 2003) (noting that Freeman's source accused him of fabricating quotes).
6 Seth Mnookin, Is Rolling Stone's HIV Story Wildly Exaggerated, Newsweek Web
Exclusive (Jan 23, 2003).
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nomenon of "bug-chasing" does exist and is a problem in the gay
community.7
Although "bug-chasing" behavior remains unregulated,
many states have enacted statutes regulating HIV transmission.8 States responded to the AIDS crisis by passing statutes
criminalizing the transmission of the HIV virus.9 In 1990, the
federal government demonstrated its approval of such measures
by passing the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources
Emergency (CARE) Act of 1990, codified in scattered sections of
Title 42 of the United States Code.'0 The Act "provides emergency AIDS relief grants if a State has statutes which allow a
person to be prosecuted for intentionally transmitting HIV to
another person."" Sensational cases such as that of Nushawn
Williams, a young man who intentionally infected nearly a dozen
women and girls in upstate New York with HIV in 1997, acceler12
ated state efforts to criminalize HIV transmission.
HIV transmission statutes vary from state to state. Most
statutes do not require specific intent to infect. 3 Some include
failure to disclose one's HIV status as an element of the crime,
some allow consent as an affirmative defense, and some make no
mention of consent, leaving open the possibility that individuals
7 See, for example, Bernard E. Harcourt, Forword: "You Are Entering a Gay and
Lesbian-FreeZone": On the RadicalDissents ofJustice Scalia and Other (Post-)Queers.
[RaisingQuestionsAbout Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the CriminalLaw], 94 J Crim Law &
Criminology 503, 507 and n16 (2004) (discussing the practice of bug-chasing); Robert W.
Welkos, When 7'he Gil'isHIV; A documentary enters a realm where men seek infection.
It's not a picture of AIDS that lands quietly, LA Times El (Jan 11, 2004) (reviewing
Louise Hogarth's documentary on "bug-chasers"); Andrew Jacobs, Searchingfor Ways to
CounterLax Attitudes and Risky Behavior, NY Times 29 (Apr 3, 2005) (discussing "bugchasing" as evidence of the gay communities' relaxed attitude toward safe sex); Richard
Roeper, What Makes "bug-chasers", "gift-givers"Do Such a Thing?, Chi Sun-Times 11
(Apr 22, 2003) (discussing "bug-chasing" in Freedman's article and Hogarth's documentary); Cheryl Clark, AIDS ResearchersReport an Increasein Unsafe Sex; In Some Cases,
PartnersInfected Deliberately,San Diego Union-Tribune Al (Feb 19, 2001) (examining
"bug-chasing" and the trend of knowingly infecting others with HIV).
8 For a general discussion see Zita Lazzarini, Sarah Bray, and Scott Burris, Evaluating the Impact of CriminalLaws on HIV Risk Behavior, 30 J L Med & Ethics 239
(2002).
9 See id at 241 ("Twenty-four states have adopted statutes that criminalize exposure
or transmission of HIV by at least some forms of behavior.").
10 Schuyler Frautschi, Understandingthe Public Health PoliciesBehind Ferguson,
27 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 587, 610-11 (2001-02).
11 Id at 610, quoting Jodi Mosiello, Note, Why the IntentionalSexual Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)Should be Criminahzed Through the Use of Specific HIVCriminalStatutes, 15 NYL Sch J Hum Rts 595, 599 (1999).
12 Frautschi, 27 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 610 (cited in note 10).
13 Leslie E. Wolf and Richard Vezina, Crime and Punishment:Is There a Role for
CriminalLaw in HIVPreventionPolicyZ 25 Whittier L Rev 821, 848 (2004).
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infected with HIV could be prosecuted for consensual exposure. 4
This Comment addresses the legal implications concerning
intentional consensual HIV transmission through "bug-chasing"
and "gift-giving." It examines the difficulty of tailoring HIV
transmission statutes narrowly enough so that they criminalize
the activity of "bug-chasing" without trampling constitutional
rights or falling outside the police power of the state. Part I describes the current legal landscape concerning the regulation of
HIV transmission by focusing on the scope of the police power of
the state in regulating private sexual conduct and public health.
Part II synthesizes the court decisions discussed in Part I, concluding that it is legally possible to tailor a statute narrowly
enough so that it criminalizes "bug-chasing" behavior without
trampling legitimate privacy concerns.
I. HIV TRANSMISSION STATUTES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
This Part traces the evolution of criminal HIV statutes and
lays out the elements of the crime as described in those statutes,
identifying statutes that are drawn in such a way that they could
be read to sweep in "gift-giving." While there have been constitutional challenges to state HIV transmission statutes, none of the
challenged statutes have criminalized "gift-giving." Nonetheless,
it is illuminating to look at the grounds for the challenges and
the ways in which courts have analyzed them and this Part does
that. Next, it discusses cases of HIV transmission tried under
military law in which individuals were found guilty of transmitting HIV to an informed partner-"gift-giving" without the intent.
Finally, it addresses the police power of the state and the conflict
between police power and privacy interests in consensual sexual
relations raised in the context of substantive due process.
A. HIV Transmission Statutes
Commentators have identified three separate stages in the
emergence of HIV transmission statutes. 5 The first stage came
when the HIV/AIDS epidemic was first identified and publicized,
and legislatures responded to the growing epidemic. 6 Next, following the passage of the Ryan White CARE Act, 7 states modi15

Id at 854-55.
Id at 844.

16

Id.

17

Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub L No

14

101-381, 104 Stat. 576, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 300ff-li to 300ff-88 (1996).
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fled their laws in order to secure funding under the Act. Those
states that did not already have HIV statutes on their books
scrambled to add them, and those that already had them brought
them into compliance with the Act's requirements."8 A third
wave of HIV/AIDS transmission legislation followed the sensational Nushawn Williams case in 1997. In response to massive
media coverage, state legislatures adopted bills covering intentional HIV exposure and those with statutes already on the
books increased the penalties for intentional exposure.19
Currently, twenty-four states have statutes that criminalize
the act of knowingly exposing another human being to HIV.2 °
The elements of the crime identified in these statutes may include, in various combinations depending on the statute, intent
to engage in activity that might result in transmission, intent to
transmit, and non-disclosure of one's HIV status. "[T]he vast majority of statutes do not require intent to harm, only intent to
engage in the activity that creates the exposure."21 Specifically,
only four of the laws dealing with the sexual transmission of HIV
"require intent to infect as an element of the crime."22
Ten state HIV transmission statutes make failure to disclose
one's HIV status an element of the crime (Arkansas, California,
Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and South Carolina), while another eight make consent an affirmative defense (Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Tennessee).23 However,
the state of North Dakota allows consent as an affirmative defense only if the sexual activity took place "with the use of an
appropriate prophylactic device," essentially making unprotected
sex a crime for anyone with HIV.24
Maryland, Virginia, and Washington "fail to mention consent, which may leave HIV-infected individuals vulnerable to
prosecution for consensual acts."2" Of those, Washington26 and
18 Wolf and Vezina, 25 Whittier L Rev at 844 (cited in note 13).
19 Id.
20 See Lazzarini, Bray, and Burris, Evaluating the Impact of CriminalLaws at 241
(cited in note 9) ("Twenty-four states have adopted statutes that criminalize exposure or
transmission of HIV by at least some forms of behavior.").
21 Wolf and Vezina, 25 Whittier L Rev at 848 (cited in note 13).
22 Lazzarini, 30 J L Med & Ethics at 241 (cited in note 8).
23 Wolf and Vezina, 25 Whittier L Rev at 854 (cited in note 13).
24 ND Crim Code § 12.1-20-17(3) (1997).
25 Wolf and Vezina, 25 Whittier L Rev at 854-55 (cited in note 13).
26 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9A.36.011 (West 2000) ("A person is guilty of assault in the
first degree if he or she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm: ...[a]dministers, ex-
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Virginia27 require specific intent to transmit the infection. Maryland requires intent only if the victim does not contract the virus." In this sense, Virginia and Washington's statutes criminalize only "gift-giving" behavior and behavior using sexual intercourse as a weapon; Maryland criminalizes any sexual behavior
that results in the transmission of HIV regardless of whether the
transmission of the virus was intentional. Virginia's and Washington's statutes, then, are the only statutes that are designed so
that they criminalize the "gift-giving"/"bug-chasing" phenomenon
while not criminalizing accidental transmission of HIV between
an HIV-positive partner and an informed partner.
B. Case Law Concerning the Police Power of the State
This section addresses the evolution of case law regarding
the police power of the state to make laws concerning public
health. It traces the Supreme Court's attitude toward police
power from the early twentieth century through more recent decisions, where police power has been eroded as it has come into
conflict with the Court's conception of substantive due process.
Courts' interpretations of the extent of the police power to regulate public health when that power comes into conflict with a
person's privacy interest will determine whether they find statutes criminalizing "gift-giving" constitutional.
1. Police power and public health: Jacobson v Massachusetts.
Regulation of public health and welfare is reserved to the
states in the Constitution.2 9 Accordingly, states have the power
to pass laws criminalizing behavior likely to endanger public
health. The making and enforcing of such laws constitutes the
police power of the state.
In 1905 the Supreme Court affirmed that the police power
extended to issues of public health in Jacobson v Massachusetts.3" That case involved a challenge to a Massachusetts statposes, or transmits to or causes to be taken by another ...

the human immunodeficiency

virus.").
27

Va Code Ann § 18.2-67.4:1 (2004) ("Any person who, knowing he is infected with

HIV, ... has sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus or anal intercourse with
the intent to transmit the infection to another person is guilty of a Class 6 felony.").
28 Md Health-Gen Code Ann § 18-601.1(a) (LexisNexis 2005) ("An individual who has
the human immunodeficiency virus may not knowingly transfer or attempt to transfer
the human immunodeficiency virus to another individual.").
29 See US Const Amend X.
30 197 US 11 (1905).
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ute requiring smallpox vaccination." In upholding the constitutionality of the statute the Court stated that, "[a]ccording to settled principles the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly
by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the
public safety."3 2 The Court went on to say that,
If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action in respect of a matter affecting the general
welfare, it can only be when that which the legislature
has done comes within the rule that if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the
public morals or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a
plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the Constitution.3
In so saying, the court left open the possibility of due process
challenges to laws enacted under the auspices of state police
powers.
2. The road to Lawrence v Texas- the evolution of substantive due process and the right to privacy.
While Jacobson establishes a seemingly strong police power
in the states with regard to public health issues, in more recent
cases the Court has recognized the right of individuals to be free
of government regulation in their private sexual relations. The
conflict between these competing concerns is implicated in any
analysis of HIV transmission statutes. Since Jacobson,the Court
has recognized an increasingly broad right to privacy in intimate
3 4 the Court invalirelations. First, in Griswold v Connecticut,
dated a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives,
stating,
The present case, then, concerns a relationship [the marital relationship] lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contracep31
32

Id.
Id at 25.

33 Id at

31.

34 381 US 479 (1965).
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tives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum
destructive impact upon that relationship."
Then, in PlannedParenthoodv Casey,36 the Court extended
the privacy right first articulated in Giswold to unmarried persons, stating that, "Our cases recognize 'the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'37
The textual interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment that forms the basis of the Court's decisions in Gziswold, Roe v Wade,3" Casey, and, ultimately, Lawrence v Texas 9 finds its source in Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Poe v Ullman. a° In that dissent, Justice Harlan argued
that the court had consistently refused to limit due process to
procedural fairness because if it did, the Due Process Clause
would not protect individuals in "situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation
which by operating in the future could, given even the fairest
possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless
destroy the enjoyment of all three."4 1
It is important to note that there is no one true precedent
recognizing substantive due process.4 2 Nonetheless, "it is settled
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term
liberty are protected by the federal Constitution from invasion by
the States."4 3
In applying substantive due process to statutes, the Court
employs one of two levels of scrutiny. If the Court finds that the
statute does not impinge on a "fundamental right," the Court
applies a rational basis analysis: if the statute in question has a
35 Id at 485 (emphasis in original).

505 US 833 (1992).
Id at 851, quoting Eisenstadt vBaird,405 US 438, 453 (1972).
38 410 US 113 (1973).
36
37

39 539 US 558 (2003).
40

367 US 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan dissenting) . See also John Harrison, Substan-

tive Due Process and the ConstitutionalText, 83 Va L Rev 493, 502 (1997) (describing
Harlan's dissent in Poe as "the proximate source of the contemporary right to privacy").
41 Poe, 367 US at 541.
42 Whitney v California,274 US 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis concurring).
43

Id.
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rational relationship to a permissible governmental objective, the
statute passes muster.' In contrast, when the Court finds that a
statute tramples on a "fundamental right," it subjects the statute
to strict scrutiny, which requires the government to prove the
statute is necessary to further a substantial government interest.4 5
3. Lawrence v Texas.
In Lawrence v Texas,4 6 the Court explicitly held that the
right to privacy encompasses consensual sexual acts and implicitly held that such acts are fundamental rights demanding strict
scrutiny analysis. The Court in Lawrence struck down a Texas
sodomy statute, explaining,
[t]he case... involve[s] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices
....
The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.47
At the same time, the court acknowledged that "[t]he Texas
statute further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."4" So it appeared that after Lawrence, the police power of the
state would not extend to consensual sexual conduct without a
showing of a legitimate state interest-although the court never
discussed what a sufficient legitimate state interest would be.
However, in subsequent decisions courts have not interpreted Lawrence so expansively. In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia pointed out that "nowhere does the Court's opinion
declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under
the Due Process Clause."4 9 However, at the same time the Court
appeared to apply strict scrutiny to the statute in question. 50 Re44

Harrison, 83 Va L Rev at 500-01 (cited in note 40).

45

Id.

46

Lawrence, 539 US at 558.

41 Id at 578.
48

Id.

49 Id at 586 (Scalia dissenting).

50 Lawrence, 539 US at 578 ("The Texas statute further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.").
Under the scrutiny applied when fundamental rights are not implicated, the appropriate

CRIMINALIzING CONSENSUAL TRANSMISSION OFHIV

389]

397

cently, the Seventh Circuit entertained a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that the statute the petitioner had
been convicted under, a Wisconsin statute prohibiting incest,
was unconstitutional after the Lawrence opinion.51 The petitioner in this case argued that Lawrence identified a constitutional right to privacy for all sexual acts between consenting
adults.52 But the Seventh Circuit interpreted Lawrence narrowly,
confining its application to acts of homosexual sodomy and denying that the right identified in Lawrence applied to incest.5 3 The
court stated, "Lawrence... did not announce ...a fundamental
right, protected by the Constitution, for adults to engage in all
manner of consensual sexual conduct, specifically in this case,
incest.... Lawrence, whatever its ramifications, does not, in and
of itself, go so far. " '
While the broad police power with regard to public health
and welfare identified in Jacobson was gradually eroded as it
came into conflict with substantive due process concerns in
Griswold, Roe, Casey, and ultimately Lawrence, courts most recently have been loathe to interpret Lawrence in its strongest
form. This indicates that courts might construe the privacy interest identified in Lawrence narrowly when presented with an
HIV transmission statute. "Bug-chasing" and "gift-giving" were
certainly not within the privacy interests contemplated by the
Court in the Lawrence decision.
C. Case Law Concerning HIV Transmission
Courts have unfailingly upheld the constitutionality of state
HIV statutes. In addition, military courts have found individuals
guilty of offenses such as aggravated assault and wanton disregard for human life for transmitting the HIV virus to informed,
consenting partners. This section examines these cases.
1. Constitutionality of HIV statutes.
State HIV transmission statutes have unfailingly survived
constitutional challenges. However, all of the cases were decided
inquiry is whether there is a rational basis for the law.
51 Muth vFrank,412 F3d 808 (7th Cir 2005).
52 Id at 817.
53 Id.
54 Id. See also Williams v Attorney Generalof Ala, 378 F3d 1232, 1234-35 (11th Cir
2004) ("[N]o Supreme Court precedents, including the recent decision in Lawrence v
Texas are decisive on the question of the existence of... a right [to sexual privacy].").
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pre-Lawrence and none of the challenges have involved the informed consent issue.
In 1993, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held
that Louisiana's transmission statute, which provided: "No person shall intentionally expose another to any acquired immunity
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus through sexual conduct without the knowing and lawful consent of the victim,"5 was neither
vague nor overbroad.5 6 The court also held that the defendant's
claim that "the statute interferes with the right of an HIVinfected person to engage in sexual activities"5 7 was without
merit, concluding:
The right of privacy is not absolute; it is qualified by the
rights of others. Furthermore, the right of privacy does
not shield all private sexual acts from state regulation. No
one can seriously doubt that the state has a compelling
interest in discouraging the spread of the HIV virus."
Thus, in this case, the court found the state's need to protect
the public health outweighs the individual's privacy interest.
In Illinois, where informed consent is an affirmative defense
to the crime of intentionally transmitting the HIV virus, the
State Supreme Court overturned Illinois trial courts' decisions
invalidating the state's HIV statute.59 Defendants had challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated the defendants'
right to free speech and association, and that it was unconstitutionally vague.6" In analyzing the freedom of association issue,
after stating that it recognized no constitutional right to intimate
association, the court in dictum opined as to what a supposed
right to intimate association would properly encompass. It
pointed out that in situations where a defendant had not informed his partner of his HIV status (as was the case for one of

the defendants) or a defendant awaro of hi

-TTV inferioen_ hnr

forcibly raped another person, "i]t is preposterous to argue that
the statute constitutes a violation of... the ...supposed right to
intimate association."6 ' Turning to the vagueness contention,
while conceding that "[v]agueness, like beauty, may be in the eye
5 La Rev Stat § 14:43.5(a) (West 1997).
16 Louisiana v Gamberella,633 S2d 595, 603 (La App 1993).
17 Id at 603.
68 Id at 604 (citations omitted).
'9 People vRussell, 630 NE2d 794 (11 1994).
60 Id at 795-96.
61 Id at 796.
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of the beholder," it held that the statute was "sufficiently clear
and explicit" to meet constitutional requirements.6 2
Finally, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in 1998, held that
that state's HIV transmission statute was neither "unconstitutionally infirm on the basis that it lack[ed] an explicit mens rea
requirement," nor violative of the defendant's right to privacy or
the right to be free from compelled speech. 3 With regard to the
defendant's privacy challenge, the court said, "[w]e believe that
defendant's ostensible right to withhold her HIV status from her
sexual partners is not an absolute right when balanced against
the state's 'unqualified interest' in preserving human life."'
In all of these cases, courts found the public health interest
to be compelling enough that state police power outweighed due
process concerns. In effect, the courts said that the right to privacy did not encompass the right to infect another person with a
deadly virus without that person's consent.
2. Military cases concerning HIV transmission.
The only case law concerning the transmission of HIV with
the informed consent of the victim is found in military courts.
The defendants in these cases were not charged for violating HIV
transmission statutes, but rather for violating the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 USC Ch 47. The charges ranged from aggravated assault to wanton disregard for human life and in
reaching their holdings the military courts relied heavily on potential third party harms and, more significantly, the importance
of maintaining discipline and order. Notably, 10 USC § 934 Art
134 provides that "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces ... shall be taken
cognizance of by a [military court] ... and shall be punished at
the discretion of that court."
The leading case on consensual HIV transmission is United
States v Bygrave.6 In Bygrave, the HIV-positive defendant was
charged with assault with a means likely to cause death or
grievous bodily harm to a woman who knew of his HIV positive
status and with whom he had unprotected sexual intercourse.66
62

Id.

63 People v Jensen, 586 NW2d 748, 755-59 (Mich App 1998).
64 Id at 756, quoting Cruzan v Director, Milssoui Dep't of Health, 497 US 261, 282

(1990).
65 46 MJ 491 (Ct App Armed Forces 1997).
66 Id at 492.
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In the decision, which preceded Lawrence, the military court
found that case law was inconclusive as to whether the right to
privacy encompassed acts of sexual intercourse between consenting, unmarried adults and in such a case "the most prudent
course of action is to assess the governmental interests counterbalancing the proposed right before determining conclusively
whether the right exists."67 In upholding the assault conviction,
the court held that the government's interest in the health of the
defendant's sexual partner was "not negated by the fact that
[she] chose to put her own health in danger by having unprotected sex with an HIV-positive partner."6' The court explained
that
[b]y compromising her own health, she also risked compromising the health of others. The Government's interests in the present case are not limited to the health of
[this woman], but also encompass the health of any sexual
partners she may have in the future, any children she
may bear, and anyone else to whom she may potentially
transmit HIV through nonsexual contact.6 9
Similarly, in United States v Johnson,7" a military court held
that the HIV-infected defendant, who did not inform his partner
of his HIV status, was guilty of aggravated assault and that even
had he informed his partner of his HIV status, "consent by the
victim is not a valid defense when the conduct is of a nature to be
injurious to the public as well as to the party assaulted."7 '
In United States v Morris,2 the court held the defendant
guilty of wanton disregard for human life for engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse with a partner who was informed of his
HIV status and nonetheless consented, explaining,
the. . . "essence" of the offense.., hence its criminality, is
that the appellant "engaged in sexual intercourse with
another, knowing that to do so without protection was an
'inherently dangerous' act likely leading to 'death or great
bodily harm,' and that under the circumstances his conduct was 'prejudicial to the good order and discipline in
67
68
69
70

Id at 495.
Id at 496.
Bygrave, 46 MJ 491.
27 MJ 798 (Air Force Ct Mil Rev 1988).

71 Id
72

at 804.

30 MJ 1221 (Army Ct Mil Rev 1990).
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Thus, ultimately, the criminality of the act lay in the fact
that it posed a danger to military order. The court in Morristhus
made explicit what had been an implicit background consideration in Bygrave and Johnson.
The approach to HIV transmission taken by the military is
similar to the approach taken by Maryland's statute in that HIV
transmission is a criminal act, regardless of consent. In all these
cases, even without the intent to transmit inherent in "giftgiving," interests in public health and military order were found
to outweigh the privacy interests of individual soldiers. This
makes sense because, in the military, health interests are
heightened due to the limited size of the world in which individuals move (one's movements might be confined to a ship, or a
small military base for months on end) and because of the military's raison d'6tre (sick soldiers are not particularly effective in
protecting the national interest).
II. CRIMINALIZING "GIFT-GIVING": CONSTITUTIONALLY POSSIBLE

AND SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
Three state statutes (those of Maryland, Virginia, and
Washington) appear to criminalize "gift-giving" by including neither failure to inform a partner of one's HIV status as an element of the offense nor informed consent of one's partner as an
affirmative defense. This Part analyzes these statutes in terms of
their constitutionality by applying the reasoning used by the
courts in the cases discussed in Part I, and then in terms of their
public policy functions and implications.
A. Acceptable Manifestation of Police Power
Although it does present the potential for third party harms,
"bug-chasing" is, like suicide, an activity that causes harm primarily to the person engaging in the activity. Thus, for the same
reasons it is difficult to criminalize suicide, it is difficult to explicitly criminalize "bug-chasing." But some HIV transmission
statutes implicitly criminalize "gift-giving." The statutes of
Maryland,7 4 Virginia,75 and Washington, 6 in failing to make non73
74
75
76

Id at 1228, quoting United States v Woods, 28 MJ 318, 320 (Ct Mil App 1989).
Md Health-Gen Code Ann 18-601.1 (2000).
Va Code Ann 18.2-67.4:1 (1996 & Supp 2003).
Wash Rev Code Ann 9A.36.011 (West 2000).
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disclosure of HIV status an element of the crime or informed
consent an affirmative defense, leave open the possibility of
prosecuting "gift-givers." However, the question remains
whether statutes drafted in such a way are constitutional and an
acceptable manifestation of the police power of the state.
All the cases holding HIV transmission statutes to be constitutional involved statutes that either make withholding one's
HIV status from one's partner an element of the crime or allow
the informed consent of one's partner as an affirmative defense. 7
These court decisions, as discussed below, hinge on the notion of
informed consent. In Gamberella, the defendant "argue[d] that
the statute interfere[d] with the right of an HIV-infected person
to engage in sexual activities."" However, the court responded
that:
[T]he right of privacy does not shield all private sexual
acts from state regulation. No one can seriously doubt
that the state has a compelling interest in discouraging
the spread of the HIV virus. Forcingan infected person to
inform all of his sexual partnersso the partnercan make
an informed decision prior to engaging in sexual activity
furthers the state's interest in preventing the spread of
the virus.7 9
Similarly, in Jensen the court said "Michigan has an undeniable compelling interest in discouraging the spread of the HIV
virus. Requiringan infected person to so inform sexualpartners
so they can make an informed decision before engagingin sexual
penetration is narrowly tailored to further this compelling state
interest."8" Finally, in Russell, the court, after noting that it
"kn[e]w of no such right," said it was "preposterous" to argue
that a defendant's right to intimate association was violated
when she neglected to inform her partner of her HIV status.8"
The courts in Jensen and Russell, both decided before Lawrence, refused to recognize a right to intimate sexual contact but
nonetheless based their decisions largely on the informed con-

" See Jensen, 586 NW2d 748 (upholding constitutionality of statute criminalizing
withholding knowledge of HIV-positive status); Russell, 630 NE2d 794 (upholding statute
where informed consent is an affirmative defense and withholding knowledge of HIVpositive status is an element of the crime); Gamberella,633 S2d 595 (same).
78 Gamberella,633 S2d at 603.
79 Id at 604 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
80 Jensen, 586 NW2d at 757 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
81 Russell,630 NE2d at 796.
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sent provisions in the statutes being challenged. 2 It therefore
appears that Maryland's statute might, after Lawrence, be unconstitutional.
In Lawrence, the Court recognized a right of privacy in consensual sexual relations absent a showing of a legitimate state
interest.8 3 Maryland's statute, in not allowing informed consent
as a defense, does "interfer[e] with the right of an HIV-infected
person to engage in sexual activities."" Even in Jacobson, which
recognized a broad police power with regard to issues of public
health, the Court was careful to point out that "the police power
of a State... may be exerted in such circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases as to justify
the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression."85
However, in cases interpreting Lawrence, courts have refused to construe Lawrence as identifying a constitutionally protected right to engage in all consensual sexual conduct.8 6 Nonetheless, when the Seventh Circuit interpreted Lawrence narrowly and refused to extend Lawrencds holding to sweep up incest, it said that the Lawrence Court recognized a protected interest in homosexual sodomy. 7 However, it should be noted that
one of the Lawrence Court's main criticisms of the decision it
overruled, Bowers v Hardwick, s was that the Bowers Court
stated the issue presented as whether there is a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy.8 9 The Lawrence Court
said that framing the issue that way, "disclose[d] the Court's own
failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake" and that
the statutes under consideration in those cases "ha[d] more farreaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home."9" The Seventh Circuit's narrow interpretation runs contrary to these statements of the Court in Lawrence. Nonetheless,
even under the Seventh Circuit's narrow interpretation, consen82

Jensen, 586 NW2d at 757; Russell,630 NE2d at 796.

83 Lawrence, 539 US at 578.
14 Gamberella,633 S2d at 603.
" Jacobson, 197 US at 38.
s6 See Muth, 412 F3d 808 at 817 ("Lawrence also did not announce ...a fundamental
right, protected by the Constitution for adults to engage in all manner of consensual
sexual conduct."); Williams, 378 F3d 1232 at 1238 ("[W]e decline to extrapolate from
Lawrence and its dicta a right to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny.").
87 Muth, 412 F3d at 817.
88 478 US 186 (1986) (overruled).
89 Lawrence, 539 US at 567.
90 Id.
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sual sodomy acts of HIV-positive homosexuals would probably be
protected. There have been no cases since Lawrence in which a
public health statute has been challenged on the ground that it
violates the Court's ruling in Lawrence. It seems plausible that
after Lawrence, the Court would deem statutes criminalizing all
acts of unprotected sex by HIV-positive persons "oppressive."
However, lower courts seeking to reign in the Court's holding in Lawrence might give extra weight to the public health risk
presented by the AIDS virus, and a majority of the newlycomposed Supreme Court might be similarly disposed. The fact
that the Court in Lawrence declined to explicitly recognize a
"fundamental right" in intimate sexual relations means that a
court analyzing an HIV statute would not have to subject the
statute to strict scrutiny; under rational basis scrutiny it would
only have to find a "legitimate state interest" in the prevention of
HIV transmission.
Nonetheless, while Bygrave, Johnson, and Morris all upheld
the constitutionality of convictions for HIV transmission to partners who gave their informed consent by citing a legitimate interest in health and welfare,9 ' there are compelling reasons why
these cases might come out differently in a non-military court
today. First, they were all decided before the Court in Lawrence
recognized a right to privacy in consensual sexual relations. In
fact, the court in Bygrave specifically cited Bowers,92 the case
that Lawrence overruled, saying that "the Supreme Court has
made equally clear that there is no generalized constitutional
right to sexual intimacy between consenting adults."93 Second,
these cases were not prosecuted under civilian law but under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.94 It is important to consider
the emphasis the military places on good order and discipline
when analyzing military case law.9" In fact, in Morris, the court
went so far as to say that the "essence" of the defendant's crime
was that "under the circumstances his conduct was 'prejudicial
to the good order and discipline in the Armed Forces."'96 The
91 Bygrave, 46 MJ 491; Johnson, 27 MJ 798; Morris,30 MJ 1221.
92 478 US 186 (1986) (overruled).
93 Bygrave, 46 MJ at 495; Lawrence, 539 US at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today.").
94 UCMJ, Art 134, 10 USCA § 934.
95 For example, 10 USC § 934 Art 134, providing that "all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces ... shall be taken cognizance of by a [military court]... and shall be punished at the discretion of that court."
96 Morris,30 MJ at 1228.

389]

CRIMINALIZING CONSENSUAL TRANSMISSION

OFHIV

405

criminalization of this behavior under the Uniform Code of Military Justice is not indicative of how such behavior would be regarded in a civilian court of law.97
As noted above, one could make a powerful argument that
even after Lawrence the state interest in controlling HIV transmission is compelling enough to justify the intrusion of the
state's police power into intimate sexual relations. Criminalizing
sex that might result in transmission of a deadly disease is very
different from criminalizing homosexual sodomy.9" However, a
statute criminalizing all unprotected sex that HIV-positive persons engaged in by definition would sweep in unprotected sex
between married people when one of those people is HIVpositive. The marriage bond is one that the Supreme Court has
traditionally held sacred.99 Even the military court in Bygrave
declined to rule on whether HIV transmission with informed
consent within a marital relationship would be criminal."'
So, is there a way to draw a statute that criminalizes HIV
transmission or exposure with informed consent ("gift-giving")
that passes constitutional muster? Perhaps there is. Virginia's
HIV transmission statute provides that "[a]ny person who, knowing he is infected with HIV, syphilis, or hepatitis B, has sexual
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus or anal intercourse
with the intent to transmit the infection to another person is
guilty of a Class 6 felony."' By making intent to transmit an
element of the crime, the statute criminalizes not the sexual act
but the intent to cause harm. There is almost certainly a legitimate interest in such a case and the statute is tailored so narrowly that it sweeps in only the legitimate interest.
"Bug-chasing" could certainly be labeled suicidal behavior. If
"bug-chasing" is framed as suicide, "gift-giving" would be assisting the suicide of the 'ug-chaser." The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of statutes criminalizing assisted sui97 Although civilian laws might have analogous interests, courts are not required to
analyze cases with regard to an effect on the maintenance of "good order and discipline."
98 The risks to both the individual actors and third parties are much greater in the
case of sex that could result in the transmission of HIV than they are in the case of homosexual sodomy; in fact, in the case of homosexual sodomy, third party risks are nonexistent.
"9 See, for example, Griswold,381 US 479, 486 (1965) (acknowledging the traditional
"notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship").
100 Bygrave, 46 MJ at 497 ("Nor need we consider whether our evaluation of the interests in the present case would differ if appellant had been prosecuted for sexual acts
within the context of a marital relationship.").
101Va Code Ann §§ 18.2-67.4:1 (2004).
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12
cide, even though in such cases the "victim" was consenting.
The state's interest in criminalizing the intentional transmission
of HIV to a consenting partner is even greater than the state's
interest in criminalizing assisted suicide. In cases of assisted
suicide, the only life taken is that of the person assisted. In cases
of HIV transmission other lives besides that of the "bug-chaser"
are endangered since there is the risk of incidental exposure to
other members of the public, as well as the risk that once infected the victim may pass the disease on to other sexual partners.
Although it has been argued that there is an implicit defense
of informed consent in those statutes where the defense is not
explicit,'0 3 Virginia's statute is written in a way that makes it
difficult to read in such a defense. While § 18.2-67.4:1(A) makes
intent to transmit HIV a Class 6 Felony and makes no mention
of informed consent, § 18.2-67.4:1(B) reads as follows: "Any person who, knowing he is infected with HIV, syphilis, or hepatitis
B, has sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus or
anal intercourse with another person without having previously
disclosed the existence of his infection to the other person is
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor." By specifically making nondisclosure an element of the crime in § 18.2-64.4:1(B), the legislature may have effectively precluded courts from reading nondisclosure into § 18.2-67.4:1(A).
In summary, Virginia's statute criminalizes "gift-giving" and
yet is tailored narrowly enough that even under an expansive
interpretation of Lawrence it would be considered an acceptable
manifestation of police power.

B. Criminalizing Informed, Consensual HIV Transmission is
Wise Public Policy
It can be argued that statutes criminalizing HIV exposure
might frustrate public health efforts by deterring people from
getting tested: if they do not know their HIV status, these people
cannot be guilty of knowingly exposing a sexual partner to HIV.
Leslie E. Wolf and Richard Vezina have made this argument:
102

See Vacco v Quill,521 US 793 (1997) (holding that a New York statute prohibiting

assisted suicide does not offend the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v Glucksberg,521 US 702 (1997) (upholding Washington criminalization of assisted suicide because it is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
due process clause).
103 Gene P. Schultz and Meg Reuter, AIDS Legislation in Missouri:An Analysis and a
Proposal,53 Mo L Rev 599, 622-27 (1988).
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"Although there is little data on this issue, the threat of criminal
prosecution may deter people from HIV testing, counseling, and
treatment. People who do not know their HIV status may be
more likely to engage in high-risk behaviors, and, therefore, may
increase the spread of HIV transmission."10 4 Certainly a statute
like that of Maryland which criminalizes all unprotected sex
practiced by HIV-positive persons might have this effect. However a statute like Virginia's or Washington's that only criminalizes sex with the intent of transmitting HIV might deter intentional transmission of the virus but not testing. Under Virginia's
and Washington's statutes, one can engage in unprotected sex
even with the knowledge one is HIV-positive without running
afoul of the statute so long as one has no intent to transmit the
virus to one's partner.
The problem with statutes criminalizing intentional, consensual transmission of HIV is that they are very difficult to enforce.
There is of course the issue of proving intent that occurs with all
statutes making intent an element of the offense. There is also
an additional issue unique to intentional, consensual HIV
transmission statutes: outside the closely-regulated world of the
military it is unlikely that transgressions of the statute would
come to the attention of law enforcement, which might explain
why military courts are the only fora in which defendants have
been prosecuted for HIV transmission with informed consent.
One way might to overcome this problem would be to regulate the acts leading up to the actual transmission. The "bugchasing" phenomenon has been fueled in large part by the internet.' Because "gift-givers" post ads on internet sites, one way to
enforce intentional HIV transmission with informed consent
could be to criminalize transmission attempts, police gay websites, and prosecute "gift-givers" posting on the sites. However,
simply posting an ad on a website would probably not be considered an attempt. For example, in State v Duke, °6 the defendant
planned a vacation to commit sex acts he had discussed with a
twelve year old girl (actually an undercover cop) he met over the
internet. The agreement between the defendant and the undercover cop was that he would flash his car lights at her to identify
himself. The court held that the overt acts of the defendant when
he planned to meet the girl, went to the appointed meeting place,
104

Wolf and Vezina, 25 Whittier L Rev at 869 (cited in note 13).

105 Freeman, In Search of Death, Rolling Stone at 45 (cited in note 1).
106 709 S2d 580 (Fla 1998).
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and flashed his car lights were all planning and did not go far
enough toward consummation to constitute an attempt at sexual
battery. Prosecuting attempts would require difficult undercover
operations in which police forces might be reluctant to invest
resources.
CONCLUSION

This comment seeks to find a statute that would criminalize
the practice of "gift-giving" while not infringing on the right to
privacy in consensual sexual relations articulated by the Supreme Court in Lawrence. After analyzing case law on HIV
transmission statutes, the police power of the state, and convictions for HIV transmission with informed consent in United
States military courts under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, HIV transmission statutes which criminalize the intentional
exposure of a partner to HIV and preclude a defense of informed
consent seem most likely to accomplish this.
It appears that statutes that deny a defense of informed consent and lack a mens rea element are probably too broad to survive a constitutional challenge after the Court's decision in Lawrence. Since Lawrence, there have not been any cases challenging public health statutes on the grounds that they violate the
constitutionally protected right to engage in private consensual
sexual behavior the Court recognized in Lawrence. Subsequent
decisions have interpreted Lawrence narrowly, denying that
there is a constitutional right to engage in consensual sexual
acts. The courts providing these interpretations might be inclined to weigh heavily the public health interest in preventing
the spread of HIV and AIDS and might therefore find such statutes constitutional. However any court sincerely interpreting
Lawrence would probably find the public health risk too slight to
allow such a broad infringement on consensual intimate conduct.
Therefore statutes which criminalize the intentionalexposure of
a partner to HIV and preclude a defense of informed consent are
the most appropriate legal means of addressing the "bugchasing" phenomenon.

